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I. INTRODUCTION
Michelle Brown was the typical girl next door. She
attended a respected university, never had any trouble with the
law, and, upon graduation, became a successful international
banker.' However, after her rental application was stolen from her
landlord's leasing office, everything Michelle had worked so hard
to achieve was stolen from her in an instant.2 In January 1999,
Michelle received a call from a Bank of America representative
inquiring about a late payment for a truck she had recently
purchased.3
Knowing she had not bought a car recently, Michelle took
appropriate steps to remedy the problem by canceling her credit
cards and having fraud alerts placed on her credit report.' This
should have been the end of Michelle's nightmare, but the damage
had already been done. Not only had the identity thief stolen
Michelle's good credit to allegedly purchase a $32,000 pick-up
truck and $5,000 worth of liposuction, the thief had also used
Michelle's identity to engage in drug trafficking, ultimately
presenting herself as Michelle Brown in front of a federal judge
when charged with smuggling three thousand pounds of marijuana
across the border.5
Michelle refers to the ordeal of battling this "true name
fraud"6 and criminal identity theft' as "by far the darkest, most
1. Identity Theft: How to Protect and Restore Your Good Name: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Tech. Terrorism, & Gov't Info. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 23, 25 (2000), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
106shrg69466/pdf/CHRG-106shrg69466.pdf [hereinafter Identity Theft] (statement of
Michelle Brown, Identity Theft Victim).
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 23.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Heather M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A
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challenging and terrifying chapter of my life."8 Michelle is just one
example of the approximately 100 million persons whose identities
are put at risk each year as a result of this violative act.9
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003
(FACTA)'0 provides mechanisms through which consumers can
combat true name fraud." True name fraud is defined as when a
"thief us[es] the victim's identifying information to open new
accounts in the victim's name."12 FACTA's Red Flags Rulel3 (The
Rule) imparts preventative measures to reduce the occurrence of
the fraud. The Rule requires qualifying businesses and
institutions 4 to implement preventative programs to alert these
institutions to the "red flags"" that might indicate that an identity
thief is attempting to use a customer's information. Provided that
Common-Sense Common Law Claim, 54 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1266 (2005) ("true name
fraud...occurs when a thief use[s] the victim's indentifying information to open a new
account in the victim's name.") (original quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holly K.
Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 237, 242 (2004)).
7. Thomas P. Vartanian & Travis P. Nelson, Identity Theft and Financial
Institutions, COMM. ON BANKING L. NEWSL. (ABA/Bus. L. Sec., Comm. on Banking
L., Chicago, I.L.), Sept. 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0057/materials/pp7.pdf (defining criminal
identity theft as providing another individual's personal information to a law
enforcement official during the course of an investigation or upon being arrested).
8. Identity Theft, supra note 1, at 23, 25 (statement of Michelle Brown, Identity
Theft Victim).
9. Identity Theft Victim Statistics, IDENTITYTHEFr.INFO,
http://www.identitytheft.info/victims.aspx.
10. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
11. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, sec. 112(a), § 605A (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681) (fraud alerts and active duty alerts), sec. 113, § 605
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)) (truncation of credit and debit card
account numbers), sec. 114, § 615 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e))
(establishment of procedures for the identification of possible instances of identity
theft), sec. 115, § 609(a)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1))
(authority to truncate social security numbers).
12. Howard, supra note 6, at 1266 (original quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and NewLaw, 30 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 242 (2004)).
13. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, sec. 114, § 615 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)).
14. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity
Theft, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(a) (2009) (explaining that financial institutions and creditors
are covered by The Rule).
15. Id. § 681.1(b)(9) ("Red Flag means a pattern, practice, or specific activity that
indicates the possible existence of identity theft.").
16. Id. § 681.1; The Red Flags Rule: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE
LIABILITY UNDER FACTA
the amendments discussed below are made to FACTA's damages
and preemption provisions, the statute will provide an appropriate
and sufficient cause of action for victims of identity theft, leaving
no reason to expand, or even utilize, tort law as a means of
recourse for true name fraud resulting from an institution failing to
detect and prevent red flag activity.
At its simplest, identity theft is the misappropriation of
another's personal information, including his or her name, address,
and Social Security number.' Identity theft is a rapidly increasing
fraudulent act." Rising rates of electronic communication and
difficult economic times only serve to exacerbate the problem,2 0
making identity theft easier to execute and identities with
favorable credit more valuable to thieves. 2' Because of the nature
COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edulmicrosites/redflagsrule/faqs.shtm.
17. See The Red Flags Rule: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16
(explaining that currently there is no private cause of action available under
FACTA).
18. Howard, supra note 6, at 1264-65 (quoting Martha A. Sabol, The Identity
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do Individual Victims Finally Get
Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 165, 166 (1999)); Brandon
McKelvey, Financial Institutions' Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Customer's
Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1077, 1082 (2001) ("Identity theft occurs when someone uses another individual's
personal information for fraudulent purposes.").
19. See Press Release, Texans Credit Union, Texans Credit Union Provides
Identity Protection for Checking Accounts (Oct. 1, 2006),
www.identityfraud.com/PDF/Texans%20IFI%20PressRelease.pdf ("The number of
personal records being lost or stolen is alarming by any standards. Recent surveys ...
indicate that there were 8.9 million victims of identity theft last year."); Brendan
Delany, Comment, Identity Theft: The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Negligent
Enablement of Imposter Fraud, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 553, 554 (2005) (stating that
identity theft is a rapidly accelerating white collar crime).
20. Stephen L. Wood & Bradley I. Schecter, Identity Theft: Developments in
Third Party Liability, SEC. OF LITIG. CONSUMER & PERS. RTS. NEWSL. (ABA/Sec. of
Litig., Consumer & Pers. Rts. Comm., Chicago I.L.), Summer 2002, available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls20Publications/RelatedDocumentsPDFsl252/380/Id
entityTheft.pdf ("Identity theft has become more and more common ... as the
Internet has opened new avenues for access to personal data . . . "); Recession Breeds
Identity Theft- Are You Ready?, IDENTITYTHEFTLABS (Sept. 24, 2009),
http://www.identitytheftlabs.comlidentity-theft/recession-breeds-identity-theft-are-
you-ready/ ("[T]he recession can breed identity theft. It's a sad but true fact that as
more people are out of work more tend to turn to crime in order to make ends
meet.").
21. Timothy L. O'Brien, Officials Worried over a Sharp Rise in Identity Theft,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/03/world/officials-worried-over-a-sharp-rise-in-
identity-theft.html ("The Social Security Administration attributes the rise to the
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of the crime, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)2 2 is unable to
definitively measure the full extent of the crime's occurrence;23
however, unofficial estimates suggest that fifteen million United
States citizens are victims of identity theft each year with
aggregate damages exceeding $50 billion annually.4 The
pervasiveness of the crime results in deleterious outcomes for
individuals and financial institutions alike.25
Part 1126 of this Note will briefly examine and define the
nature of identity theft and the prevalent threat posed by the crime
for the nation's financial institutions2 7 and, most importantly,
consumer victims." Part III29 will analyze the impact of FACTA
ease with which Social Security data can be collected on the Internet."); Andrew
Stutzman, Stutzman on a Bank's Duty to a Non-Customer: Know You Customer (and
Non-Customers) - You May have a Duty to Them Both Where Someone's Identity is
Stolen, LEXISNEXIs EMERGING ISSUES, Oct. 20, 2008 (explaining the increasing value
of identities that have good standing with their creditors); Rob Leiber, Don't Tell
Facebook Friends that You are Going Away, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010, 12:55 PM),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/dont-tell-facebook-friends-that-youre-
going-away/ (stating that Facebook's increasing popularity exposes its users to
identity theft by allowing strangers to view the birthdays of the site's users).
22. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 43 (2006) (stating that the FTC
has a broad range of authority, including the power to police anticompetitive
practices and enforce consumer protection laws).
23. See Jennifer Lee, Identity Theft Victimizes Millions, Costs Billions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/04/us/identity-theft-victimizes-millions-costs-
billions.html.
24. Identity Theft Victim Statistics, supra note 9 ("On a case-by-case basis, ....
approximately 7% of all adults have their identities misused with each instance
resulting in approximately $3,500 in losses."); see also Expert Report and Affidavit at
7, Root v. Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc., No. 07-61632-Civ-Ungaro/Simonton (S.D. Fla.
dismissed June 6, 2008), available at 2008 WL 2849190 ("The growth of identity fraud
has become such as [sic] serious social and economic problem that the Federal Trade
Commission . . . established a clearinghouse to assist victims of identity theft and
document their cases in a data base beginning in 1999.").
25. See McKelvey, supra note 18, at 1085-86 (explaining that financial institutions
and insurance companies are liable for any losses perpetuated by the fraud; however,
individuals are responsible for restoring any reputational or credit damage incurred).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(t) (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ("[A] financial institution [is] a State or National bank, a
State or Federal savings and loan association, a mutual savings bank, a State or
Federal credit union, or any other person that, directly or indirectly, holds a
transaction account ... belonging to a consumer.").
28. Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009) (stating that while identity theft is
most frequently targeted against individual consumers, that commercial customers of
financial institutions and creditors are also covered by the Rule).
[Vol. 15360
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and how it has changed the mechanisms utilized to fight true name
30
fraud by implementing stricter preventative measures.
Specifically, in relation to these mechanisms, this section will
examine the efficacy of The Rule" and argues that it is necessary
and useful in protecting against identity theft facilitated by a
financial institution's misconduct in relation to The Rule. Part IV 32
will discuss the inadequacy of tort claims as a means of
compensating and providing justice for consumer victims of
identity theft. Courts have been reluctant to recognize specialized
tort law claims such as negligent enablement of imposter fraud due
to a financial institution's lack of duty to a consumer victim and
the unforeseeability of his or her harm. Finally, in the interest of
uniformity and consistency, Part V34 of this Note will propose
several amendments to FACTA to further supplement the already
commensurate statute to provide for stricter federal preemption
and larger, more consistent damages awards.
II. CURRENT LOOK AT IDENTITY THEFT
There are two predominant types of identity fraud: criminal
identity theft" and true name fraud. While criminal identity theft
is a serious crime and of concern to consumers, it is not the focus
of the discussion here because its prevention is best established
through stricter "investigative and prosecutorial strategies"
currently being coordinated by the Secret Service and the
29. See infra Part III.
30. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2006).
31. Id. § 1681m(e).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See, e.g., Eisenburg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 224-25 (4th Cir.
2002) (claiming no duty was owed to the third party victim); Smith v. AmSouth Bank,
Inc., 892 So.2d 905, 908-10 (Ala. 2004) (stating that in order to prevail on a
negligence claim, plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty); Huggins v. Citibank,
N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the relationship between creditor and
victim is too attenuated to support an affirmative duty).
34. See infra Part V.
35. Vartanian & Nelson, supra note 7, at 2.
36. Howard, supra note 6, at 1266 (original quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law, 30 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 242 (2004)).
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Department of Justice to educate local and federal law
enforcement officials." Instead, the focus here is on the true name
fraud form of identity theft and the statutory changes necessary to
ensure victims remuneration for their losses as a result of the
fraud."'
There are three potential ways to combat both types of
identity theft. The first means is through criminal law in an action
brought by federal or local government against the identity thief.39
These actions are defined by the applicable criminal laws which
generally require fraudulent misuse of an individual's identity
before the theft is legally considered a crime."4 The second way is
through action by a federal administrative agency designated to
enforce a specific federal statute.4 1 Such a mechanism is prescribed
by FACTA as the means of recourse for consumer victims of a
financial institution's noncompliance with The Rule.42 Finally, as a
means of counteracting identity theft, a consumer can bring an
action pursuant to state common law against a negligent financial
institution, presumably because the thief is either unidentified or
judgment proof.43 These common law actions may be grounded
either in tort law or contract law, depending upon how the specific
37. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, and the Identity Theft Investigation
and Prosecution Act of 2003: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2004),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92671/pdf/CHRG-
108hhrg92671.pdf [hereinafter Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing]
(statement of Larry D. Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative
Division, U.S. Secret Service).
38. See infra Parts IV-V.
39. See Kristen S. Provenza, Note, Identity Theft: Prevention and Liability, 3 N.C.
BANKING INST. 319, 319-322 (1999) (delineating the various criminal statutes utilized
for the prosecution of identity theft).
40. Id. (describing some of the criminal statutes applicable to identity theft).
41. See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 661, 661 (1999) (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission has
been appointed to enforce the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of
1998 which makes identity theft a federal crime punishable with up to twenty-five
years in prison and maximum penalties of $250,000).
42. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 312, § 623 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2006)).
43. Provenza, supra note 39, at 330.
362 [Vol. 15
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state statute is drafted." This Note primarily focuses upon this
course of action, specifically claims pursuant to tort law.45
When identity theft occurs, there are two parties harmed by
the act: the financial institution that must absorb the financial loss
and the individual whose identity was stolen." The Rule is
formulated to protect both parties.47 However, in the context of
this Note and its discussion of inadequate tort claims, the
consumer seeking compensation under tort law is the applicable
victim. Complex issues arise as to how adequate protection can be
provided for both parties. In order to gain a full understanding of
The Rule and its procedures and protections, both parties' harm
will be discussed herein; however, particularized attention is paid
to the harm incurred by consumer victims.4
In regard to financial institutions, there are two primary
ways these institutions are disadvantaged as a result of the identity
theft of a consumer.49  The first detriment is the negative
reputational effect suffered as a result of the financial institution's
inadequate precautions against identity theft.so This problem is
more acute in the current turbulent economy, since financial
institutions need good standing in the community in order to
remain competitive." Second, financial institutions are
accountable for any losses that result from identity theft and thus
potentially face insurmountable debts ensuing from the crime.52
44. Id.
45. See infra Parts IV-V.
46. See Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009) (discussing that The Rule requires
the establishment of procedures designed to protect customers and the safety and
soundness of the financial institution or creditor).
47. See id.
48. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 114, § 615
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e) (2006)) (focusing upon the harm
incurred by consumers as opposed to the costs to financial institutions).
49. See Vartanian & Nelson, supra note 7, at 1.
50. See id.
51. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing, supra note 37 (statement of
Larry D. Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative Division, U.S.
Secret Service).
52. McKelvey, supra note 18, at 1086-87; Provenza, supra note 39, at 322 (stating
that because the financial institution must absorb the costs of the thief's expenses, the
customer victim is often legally not viewed as a victim of identity theft).
2011] 363
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As discussed above,5 3 identity theft consumer victims also
face grave financial, emotional and temporal consequences at the
hands of the thief.5 4 Thus, while financial institutions absorb the
actual monetary damages arising from the fraud, the long-term
personal effects on the consumer victim are usually more crippling
and costly." Frequently, the costs incurred by the consumer victim
far outweigh those of the financial institution once the economic
benefits afforded the financial institution and the emotional toll
upon the consumer are taken into consideration.
FACTA is equipped to eradicate true name fraud in ways
that common law tort claims fall short. FACTA attacks true
name fraud primarily through the ex ante mechanism of Identity
Theft Prevention Programs (ITPP) created by The Rule, which
should lead to a reduction of true name fraud. Consumers
53. See supra Part I.
54. See McKelvey, supra note 18, at 1087 ("For some victims, the exhausting
process of rehabilitating their credit can result in lost wages, increased stress and
even health problems.").
55. See Identity Theft, supra note 1 (statement of Michelle Brown, Identity Theft
Victim); Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Ala. 1996) (describing
how Bridgette Patrick spent approximately ten days behind bars for crimes another
committed with her stolen identity); Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing,
supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Rep. Howard Coble, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (explaining that often stolen identities are used to commit serious crimes
including the trafficking of narcotics and mail and wire fraud which can have
debilitating effects upon one's credit and general well being).
56. ORRIN G. HATCH, IDENTITY THEFr AssuMFTION AND DETERRENCE Act
REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS, S. Doc. 105-274, at 6 (2 nd Sess. 1998)
("The Federal Trade Commission testified that the identity theft victims suffer real
harm, with the effect of the theft being 'significant and long-lasting."') (original
quotation marks omitted); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft,
13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2,35 (2009) (discussing that it is more financially favorable for
a financial institution to issue accounts to all individuals who apply, despite warning
signs to the contrary, because the external economies allow them to make money
while the victims absorb much of the cost of reinstating their credit); Howard, supra
note 6, at 1266 ("In a competitive market, these institutions fear that a more rigorous
screening process might scare consumers away to competitors who do not take such
measures.").
57. See Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing, supra note 37, at 23-24
(testimony provided by Robert Ryan, Senior Director of Government Regulations,
TransUnion, LLC).
58. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity
Theft, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(d)(1) (2009) ("Each financial institution or creditor that
offers or maintains one or more covered accounts must develop and implement a
written Identity Theft Prevention Program ... that is designed to detect, prevent, and




victimized by true name fraud will receive greater vindication with
less time and anxiety, if the amendments proposed to FACTA in
this Note are adopted.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF IDENTITY THEFT
A. Initial Federal Legislative Initiatives
The government utilizes legislation to combat the growing
concern of identity theft and promote consumer privacy. 9 These
efforts began some forty years ago with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970 (FCRA), which was passed in an effort to ensure
"accuracy and confidentiality"61 in connection with credit reports.
The Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) 62 was enacted
eight years later in 1978, and denied the federal government access
to citizens' personal financial records without their express
consent.6 ' This statute did little to protect against identity theft,
however, since the majority of true name fraud is committed by
private citizens who manage to steal the relevant information from
a financial institution or a creditor's online database."
In 1998, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act" made it "a felony to possess, transfer or produce personal
identification information with unlawful intent."" This altered the
crime from one against a financial institution whose establishment
was compromised by the theft to one against the consumer victim
whose identity was stolen.67 However, even though, as a result of
59. See Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing, supra note 37, at 1
(statement of Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(discussing the threat posed by identity theft and the need for congressional action to
combat the risk).
60. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15. U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
61. Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F.Supp. 2d 776, 781 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
62. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006).
63. Id.
64. See Identity Theft, supra note 1 (statement of Michelle Brown, Identity Theft
Victim) (claiming that the system in place in 1998 clearly failed her).
65. Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006).
66. McKelvey, supra note 18, at 1092. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 6, at 1280
(explaining that while the Act might aid identity theft victims in collecting from
identity thieves, it does not assist victims in their efforts to collect damages from
financial institutions).
67. See HATCH, supra note 56, at 4 (stating that two of the purposes of the Act
2011]1 365
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the statute, identity theft was properly focused as a harmful act
against an individual victim, the penalties are directly proportional
to the severity of the particular instance of identity theft, thus does
little to deter all occurrences of the crime.6 Additionally, because
the statute does not provide for recovery by the consumer victim
from the financial institution facilitating the true name fraud, it
does little to prevent the crime from happening or remunerating
the losses suffered.69  Recovery from the financial institution is
critical because recovery from the actual identity thief is virtually
impossible due to the difficulty in determining the thief's real
identity.70
Other federal statutes concerned with protecting against
identity theft include the Identity Theft Penalty Enforcement Act"
and the Fair Credit Billing Act.72 However, because of the
reactionary nature of these statutes and their inability to deter
identity thieves, none of these statutes were successful in
eliminating, or even substantially deterring true name fraud.74
Through the enactment of FACTA and similar ex ante
mechanisms, Congress displayed its philosophy of prevention in
regard to identity theft as opposed to punishment after the crime
were to recognize the individual victims of identity theft crimes and establish their
right to restitution); Vartanian & Nelson, supra note 7, at 5.
68. See Saunders & Zucker, supra note 41, at 672 (explaining that the Sentencing
Commission is delegated broad authority in determining a punishment for
perpetrators of identity theft and thus those instances that involve large amounts of
money stolen, a great deal of planning, and a great deal of harm to the plaintiff
receive lighter penalties).
69. See Howard, supra note 6, at 1280.
70. Suing for Identity Theft Lawyers, LEGALMATCH,
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/suing-for-identity-theft.html.
71. Identity Theft Penalty Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A) (2006)
(making it a federal offense to use another's personal identifying information in the
furtherance of a felony).
72. See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C § 1666 (Supp. IV 2010) (creating
procedures to rectify billing errors on credit card accounts).
73. See infra, Part III.A.
74. 15 U.S.C § 1666.
366 [Vol. 15
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has been committed. 75 This led to the enactment of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transaction Act in 2003 .
B. The Fair and Accurate Transaction Act of 2003
The laws comprising FACTA are a series of amendments
to the FCRA.77 It contributes to the FCRA by implementing new
procedures and mechanisms for utilization in the battle against
identity theft. In addition to supplementing the previous
legislation, the FACTA rules were born out of a growing concern
that the influx of information sharing over the internet required
stronger regulations in order to better protect consumers.7 9  The
rules apply to financial institutions" and creditors.8
75. See Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009) (stating that financial institutions
and creditors should adopt procedures designed to prevent and mitigate identity theft
that are proportionate with the degree of risk posed for the customer account).
76. See Delany, supra note 19, at 576-77 (discussing how the FCRA did not live
up to Congress' expectation of reducing incidences of identity theft).
77. See Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity
Theft, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(a) (2009).
78. Ann Graham, Graham on Our Credit Reporting System & Identity Theft-
New Regulations for 2008, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES, Feb. 29,2008.
79. PATRICK LEAHY, PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009
REPORT, S. DoC. 111-110, at 2 (1" Sess. 2009) ("Advanced technologies, combined
with the realities of the post-9/11 digital era, have created strong incentives and
opportunities for collecting and selling personal information about ordinary
Americans."); see also Vartanian & Nelson, supra note 7, at 6 ("[A] response to the
growing reality that the increase in information sharing and growth in technology was
in part a catalyst for identity theft.").
80. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 111, § 603 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(t) (2006)); see also Kevin D. Lyles, Red Flag Rules
Require Companies to Take Identity Theft Seriously, JONES DAY (Nov. 2008),
http://www.jonesday.com/red-flag-rules-require-companies-to-take-identity-theft-
seriously-11-12-2008/ (stating that financial institutions, for purposes of The Rule,
include banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, or
any other entities offering a transaction account).
81. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(r)(5) ("The
terms 'credit' and 'creditor' have the same meanings as in § 1691a of this title")
(original quotation marks omitted); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1691a(e) (2006) ("[A creditor includes] any person who regularly extends, renews, or
continues credits; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or
continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the
decision to extend, renew, or continue credit.").
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One of the most influential and confusing rules included in
FACTA is the Red Flags Rule,82 which requires financial
institutions and creditors offering "covered accounts"8 3 to establish
written ITPPs customized to each institution's specific needs for
protection of its customers." Covered accounts are offered for
personal use such as checking or savings accounts or mortgage
loans. Covered accounts also include those accounts "for which
there is a reasonably foreseeable risk to customers . . . from
identity theft. . . ."8 Thus, the accounts affected by The Rule are
the ones most frequently targeted by those committing true name
fraud and thus those bearing a foreseeable risk of compromise.
FACTA operates by setting forth preventative measures necessary
for financial institutions and creditors rather than reactionary
measures taken by the consumer victims whose identities were
stolen."
The Rule instructs six agencies89 to formulate guidelines to
aid financial institutions and creditors in "identify[ing] patterns,
82. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Extends Enforcement
Deadline for Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (May 28, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/05/redflags.shtm (explaining that several Enforcement
Policy delays have been issued so that Congress has time to amend and more clearly
define the "creditors" covered by The Rule).
83. Graham, supra note 78 ("Covered accounts are accounts used primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes that involve or permit multiple payments or
transactions, in addition to any other account for which these is a reasonably
foreseeable risk to customers or the safety and soundness of the financial institution
or creditor from identity theft.").
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lyles, supra note 80.
87. See Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009) (discussing the purpose of the rules
and regulations contained within FACTA's Red Flags Rule).
88. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,728 (Nov. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 681) (listing several of the suggested measures financial
institutions and creditors could take, including (1) "monitoring an account for
evidence of identity theft," (2) "changing any passwords, security codes, or other
security devices that permit access to a customer's account," and (3) "reopening an
account with a new account number").
89. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 111, § 603 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (2006)), sec. 114, § 615 (codified as amended at §§
1681m(e)(1)(A) & (2)(A) (2006)); see also Lyles, supra note 80 ("The agencies are
(1) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; (2) the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance
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practices, and specific forms of activity that indicate . . . identity
theft."" The agencies issued their final proposals on November 9,
2007,9' and these guidelines went into effect on January 1, 2008.
However, the compliance deadline was extended for those
creditors subject to enforcement from the Federal Trade
Commission, presumably those creditors covered by The Rule who
had never before been subject to this type of financial oversight
and regulation.93 The deadline was extended to December 31,
2010.94 Compliance by financial institutions has been effective
since January 1, 2008 and enforcement has been conducted by the
institution's regulators since that date.95
The Rule consists of four basic elements for the prevention
of identity theft; however, the contents of a particular institution's
written program is flexible and should reflect the red flags
threatening that specific institution.96 First, financial institutions
and covered creditors must list specific indicators that might
signify actual or attempted theft of their customers' identity.9
Examples of these indicators that financial institutions and
creditors might want to include in their ITPP are alerts or
notifications from consumer reporting agencies, the use of
suspicious documents in the opening of an account, and suspicious
98
activity relating to an existing covered account.
Second, once the signals relevant for a specific institution
have been identified, a system must be established for detecting
Corporation; (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; (5) the National Credit
Union Administration; and (6) the Federal Trade Commission.").
90. Lyles, supra note 80.
91. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. at 63,718-63,775.
92. Id. at 63,739.
93. Lyles, supra note 80.
94. Press Release, FTC Extends Enforcement Deadline for Identity Theft Red
Flags Rule, supra note 82.
95. Lyles, supra note 80.
96. See Graham, supra note 78.
97. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity
Theft, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1 (2009).
98. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,755 (Nov. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 681).
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these red flags." The development of this system should take into
account specific risk factors such as the methods the institution
uses to open accounts and the ways in which it provides access to
its covered accounts.'" Financial institutions and creditors should
also consider adopting procedures for authenticating the identity
of an individual attempting to open an account so as to ascertain
the presence of red flags.'o
The third step is to appropriately respond to any and all
detected red flags in order to effectively mitigate the occurrence of
true name fraud.102 Any response should be proportionate to the
risk posed by the red flag so as not to be unduly burdensome for
the financial institution or creditor.1o3 This measure serves as a
means of shifting the burden of counteracting true name fraud
from response and correction by the consumer victim to efficient
prevention by the financial institution or creditor whose records
are in jeopardy.'0
Finally, the fourth step requires covered entities to update
their ITPP as required by the passing of time and evolving societal
and technological standards.o These changes should most
99. Lyles, supra note 80; The Red Flags Rule: Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 16 ("The Rule doesn't require any specific practice or procedures. It gives you
the flexibility to tailor your Program to the nature of your business and the risks it
faces.").
100. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. at 63,755.
101. Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009).
102. The response procedure is described as follows:
In determining an appropriate response, a financial institution or
creditor should consider aggravating factors that may heighten the
risk of identity theft, such as a data security incident that results in
unauthorized access to a customer's account records . . . or notice
that a customer has provided information related to a covered
account . . . to someone fraudulently claiming to represent the
financial institution or creditor or to a fraudulent website.
Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. at 63,755.
103. 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a.
104. See id.
105. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. at 63,720 ("[T]he Program
[must be] updated periodically, to reflect changes in risks to customers or to the
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importantly reflect changes in the risk posed to customers as well
as risks to the "safety and soundness of a financial institution or
creditor."'0 In light of The Rule's four parts, private action
brought pursuant to a financial institution or creditor's
noncompliance is both logical and appropriate, assuming certain
safeguards are adopted.107 Private action by consumer victims for
noncompliance is appropriate because of the industry-wide
coverage, the level of detail contained within The Rule, and the
flexibility afforded for appropriate response to varying degrees of
risks. 108
The Rule helps to prevent identity theft where the FCRA
previously fell short.109 The purpose of the FCRA is "to require
that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for
meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel,
insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and
equitable to the consumer . . . ."no This does little, if anything, to
mitigate the occurrence of true name fraud because a consumer
reporting agency is not the party responsible for the breach of
security that enables identity theft."' Instead, consumer reporting
agencies accumulate an individual's consumer credit information
and use this information to determine that individual's
creditworthiness.11 2 The FCRA, as originally enacted, established
rules to ensure that credit reporting is fair and accurate, but did
not implement mechanisms for preventing the identity theft that
led to inaccuracy."3 The FCRA failed to establish any necessary
procedures that financial institutions must abide by so that
consumer information is protected."4 FACTA's Red Flags Rule
safety and soundness of the financial institution or creditor from identity theft.").
106. 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a(V).
107. See Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. at 63,766-67 (explaining the
methods and risk factors that should be utilized and weighed when structuring an
ITPP).
108. See id.
109. See Delany, supra note 19, at 575 (discussing the shortcomings of the FCRA).
110. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2006).
111. See McKelvey, supra note 18, at 1090 (discussing how the FCRA targets the
use of credit history by specific institutions).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
114. Wood & Schecter, supra note 20, at 8.
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directly combats this shortcoming." In Michelle's case," the
preventative mechanisms that Bank of America would have
enacted in accordance with The Rule could have alerted it to the
suspicious activity and allowed it to prevent the theft entirely or
mitigate the harm Michelle suffered. In contrast, the FCRA only
allowed Michelle to place a fraud alert on her file after she
suspected or identified that she had been victimized by identity
theft.'
IV. ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS UNDER FACTA
A. Common Law Claims and True Name Fraud
When victimized by identity theft, individuals usually turn
to the courts to seek reimbursement and vindication for the
damages they have incurred."' Often, these suits are filed under
tort law," 9 frequently pursuant to the common law claim of
negligent enablement of imposter fraud.20 Other common law
claims utilized by identity theft victims include fraudulent
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and
breach of contract.12' For purposes of the discussion here, tort law
is the central focus and will be examined for its inadequacies in
regard to compensating customer victims of identity theft.22 Tort
115. See supra, pp. 111-115.
116. See supra, pp. 101-102.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(a)(1)(A).
118. See, e.g., Eisenburg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2002)
(bringing negligence action against bank); Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d
1364 (Ala. 1996) (filing negligence action against bank); Brunson v. Affinity Fed.
Credit Union, 972 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 2009) (bringing claims of negligent investigation
and malicious prosecution against credit union); Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 248
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (asserting intentional or negligent enablement of imposter
fraud); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003) (representing cases in
which victims of identity theft resorted to the common law for recourse).
119. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 11 S.E. 396, 398 (Ga. 1889) ("[A] tort is a
breach of duty which the law in distinction from a mere contract has imposed .... ).
120. See, e.g. Brunson, 972 A.2d 1112; Polzer, 256 A.D.2d 248; Huggins, 585 S.E.2d
275. But see Patrick, 681 So. 2d 1364; Howard, supra note 6, at 1272-75 (recognizing
numerous cases in which negligent enablement of imposter fraud has been utilized as
a cause of action).
121. Suing for Identity Theft Lawyers, supra note 70.
122. See infra Parts IV-V.
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law claims are pursued by plaintiffs because of the larger awards
provided by the claim; however, none of the claims are
consistently recognized by the courts in cases of identity theft,
suggesting that a federal standard of care is necessary in order to
provide full redressability for consumer victims.123
Discussed below are several reasons why negligent
enablement of imposter fraud, along with other tort law claims
often associated with identity theft, are inappropriate and ill fit to
provide redress for consumer victims of identity theft.
1. No Duty Exists to Give Rise to Tort Liability
A successful negligence claim requires affirmative proof of
four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4)
damages.124 Courts have declined to recognize negligence claims
arising from true name fraud because the claims fail to establish
the first crucial element of duty. 125 In fact, since the introduction of
negligent enablement of imposter fraud as a claim against true
name fraud, only the Alabama Supreme Court has recognized it as
valid, in the case of Patrick v. Union State Bank.1 26 Furthermore,
no published decision and only a single unpublished decision have
ever directly followed the holding reached in Patrick.127
123. See Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 30 ("In the new account identity theft
context, duty has proven to be the highest hurdle for litigants pursuing negligence
theories."); David A. Szwak, Update on Identity Theft and Negligent Enablement, 58
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 66, 71 (2004) ("These cases illustrate that a plaintiff
seeking to recover against a bank or credit issuer following an identity theft must
carefully plead and prove facts to support a negligent enablement or similar claim....
[M]ost courts do not recognize a general fiduciary duty to the public on the part of
banks or other business enterprises.").
124. Richardson v. Corvallis Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 950 P.2d 748, 751 (Mont. 1997).
125. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1367 (Ala. 1996) ("It is axiomatic that to maintain a
negligence claim, one must point to the existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant."); George v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 501 So. 2d 432, 435 (Ala.
1986) ("There can be no fraud without a breach of a legal duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff."); Haney v. Fire Ins. Exch., 277 S.W.3d 789, 792-93 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the importance of establishing the existence of a duty
owed by the defendant).
126. Patrick, 681 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1996); see also Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit
Union, 972 A.2d 1112, 1123 (N.J. 2009) (stating that the broad holding in Patrick has
been met with widespread disapproval, primarily for lack of foreseeability of harm or
existence of a duty).
127. See Brunson, 972 A.2d 1112; Torres v. Valencia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94602
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In Patrick, an identity theft victim brought suit against a
bank claiming that it negligently opened an account to an imposter
using her name.128 The plaintiff was not a customer of the bank at
the time it opened an account for the imposter. 129 The court found
a duty owed between the bank and the plaintiff because it was
"foreseeable, in terms of the question of duty, that the person in
whose name and Social Security number and upon whose
identification a checking account is opened may be injured or
harmed by fraud . . . ."'" Courts have interpreted this holding as
broadly expanding the duty of financial institutions to the public at
large.13
In cases where the true name fraud victim has prevailed
under a theory of negligence, there are separate issues that
warranted a finding of negligent conduct by the defendant
institution beyond those solely associated with negligent
enablement of imposter fraud.132 Often these additional factors
that permitted recovery resulted from the financial institution's
failure to follow its own protocol,3 3 thus breaching the standard of
care it established to benefit its customers. 34
2. No Foreseeability of Harm Exists to Give Rise to Tort Liability
The existence of foreseeable harm to the consumer victim
is just as critical to a successful negligence claim as the existence of
at 13 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 27, 2006) ("It is . . . reasonable to conclude that the bank
believed it had a relationship with plaintiff when it opened the account based upon
the presentation of his passport.").
128. Patrick, 681 So. 2d 1364.
129. Id. at 1369.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Guerra v. Regions Bank, 188 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. App. 2006)
(stating that since the plaintiff was not a customer of the facilitating bank, there is no
duty owed to the victim of the identity theft); Schleicher v. W. State Bank of Devils
Lake, 314 N.W.2d 293, 297 (N.D. 1982) (refusing to extend a bank's duty of care to
noncustomers).
132. See Murray v. Bank of America, N.A., 580 S.E.2d 194 (S.C. App. 2003)
(holding that the bank owed a duty to plaintiff because it negligently failed to follow
its own procedures).
133. Id. at 344.
134. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (defining "breach" as "the
violation of an obligation, engagement or duty . . . ").
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a legal duty between the parties."' In Brunson v. Affinity Fed.
Credit Union,"6 the Superior Court of New Jersey stated, "the
ability to foresee injury to a potential plaintiff does not in itself
establish the existence of a duty, but it is a crucial element in
determining whether imposition of a duty on an alleged tortfeasor
is appropriate." 3 7  This explanation highlights the interaction
between the duty owed and the foreseeability of the harm
suffered. 3 8 While neither element is dispositive of liability, both
are important factors to its creation.139 This is due to the fact that
courts require the presence of the element of foreseeability in any
negligence claim.'4 Claims filed pursuant to negligent enablement
of imposter fraud lack foreseeability, exposing a fatal flaw to the
successful creation of liability. 4' If a particular bank is unaware
135. See Key v. Compass Bank, Inc., 826 So. 2d 159, 170 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)
("The key factor [in a negligence claim] is whether the injury was foreseeable by the
defendant.") (quoting Smitherman v. McCafferty, 622 So. 2d 322, 324 (Ala. 1993)).
136. Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 954 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008).
137. Id. at 560 (quoting Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638
A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994)).
138. See id. ("The foreseeability of the harm is a significant consideration in the
determination of a duty to exercise reasonable care.") (quoting Carvalho v. Toll
Bros. Developers, 675 A.2d 209, 212 (N.J. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Key, 826 at 170 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ("Foreseeability is the key factor in
determining whether a duty exists.").
139. The court outlines its analysis for determining the existence of duty as
follows:
In deciding that question, three factors govern our analysis: (1) the
relationship between the parties, (2) reasonable foreseeability of
harm to the person who is injured, and (3) public policy
considerations. We use these factors under a balancing approach
and not as three distinct and necessary elements. In the end,
whether a duty exists is a policy decision based upon all relevant
considerations that guide us to conclude a particular person is
entitled to be protected from a particular type of harm.
J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle & Assocs, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
140. See Leonard v. Iowa, 491 N.W.2d 508, 510-12 (Iowa 1992) (claiming that the
scope of a duty owed is measured by the degree of foreseeability of the harm to the
victim); Knight v. Michigan, 297 N.W.2d 889, 894 (Mich. App. 1980) (stating that
foreseeability is interrelated to the establishment of duty to a third party).
141. See, e.g., DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership. Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 461
(Ala. 2008); Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 937 (Ala. 2006);
Key, 826 So. 2d at 170; Rutledge v. Arrow Aluminum Indus., Inc., 733 So. 2d 412, 416
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
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that the new customer desiring to open an account with it is an
identity thief, despite its vigilant efforts to ascertain the identity
thief's invalidity, then the bank is unable to foresee that checks
written against the account might cause harm to a third party
victim. 42 Simply because banks think they are opening an account
with a particular person does not actually establish a relationship
with that presumed individual.143 The only connection is a name.
Fraudulently attempting to open an account in another's
name has been made much more difficult by the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act.'" That Act is targeted at "facilitating the
prevention, detection, and prosecution of international money
laundering and the financing of terrorism."l45 Some of the
standards utilized for implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act
might prove useful for financial institutions in applying The Rule
to their covered accounts;'4 however, it does not address the issue
of duty owed.147 No matter which federal statutes are breached by
142. Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (Ala. 1995) (Houston, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no evidence that Union State Bank foresaw the criminal
activity of the person who opened the account in Ms. Patrick's name. Whether a legal
duty exists is a question of law for the courts."). But see, e.g., Wolfe v. MBNA Am.
Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (finding that a bank is liable under
state negligence law when it fails to complete a reasonable check as to an applicant's
information).
143. See City Check Cashing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 764 A.2d 411, 417 (N.J.
2001) ("Absent a special relationship, courts will typically bar claims of non-
customers against banks."); Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1372 (Houston, J., dissenting)
(claiming that a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care only exists when the
financial institution has actual or constructive notice that the actions of the third
party will injure the plaintiff); Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1994)
(asserting that absent a special relationship, individuals have no duty to protect
others from criminal acts of third parties).
144. See USA PATRIOT Act , Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006)).
145. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,728 (Nov. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 681).
146. Id. (discussing how the CIP rules, the Federal Financial Institution's
Examination Council's guidance on authentication, that were written to enforce the
USA PATRIOT Act might be a useful tool in aiding financial institutions to detect
red flags.) Before its passage, several commentators said that The Rule was
redundant because of its resemblance to the USA PATRIOT Act regulations.
However, because certain accounts and institutions are treated specially under the
USA PATRIOT Act because of the low risk they pose on money laundering, it is
necessary to have The Rule enacted under FACTA to fully protect against identity
theft. Id. at 63,719.
147. See Kolodziej v. Durham Agric. Fair Ass'n, Inc., 901 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Conn.
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financial institutions in allowing the creation of a fraudulent
account, there is still no duty owed between the financial
institution and the consumer victim in whose name the account is
opened without overextending the orbit of duty.'m
As evidenced through the cases declining to expand the
scope of duty owed by banks to noncustomers, the argument for
foreseeability is attenuated at best.149 For this reason, courts will
possibly disagree on the appropriate outcome of negligence
claims.so This is fundamentally unfair to victims, such as Michelle,
who are denied the ability to recover damages from the financial
institution that facilitated the fraud.
In the interest of simplicity and uniformity, noncompliance
with FACTA should replace common law negligence claims
hinging upon the existence of foreseeability and duty."' As the
statute currently stands, there is no private cause of action for
noncompliance with The Rule.52 Courts have interpreted
FACTA's amendment to 15 U.S.C. section 1681m to preclude all
private causes of action for failure to comply with the rules
established in the section.' Thus, the first step to providing
adequate redressibility for consumer victims of true name fraud is
to provide a private cause of action for noncompliance with The
App. 2006) (explaining that an actor has no affirmative duty to act for the protection
of another absent a special relationship).
14& See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314A cmtf (2010) ("The defendant
is not required to take any action until he knows or has reason to know that the
plaintiff is endangered.").
149. See Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (Ala. 1995) (Houston,
J., dissenting) (asserting that the harm to the consumer victim is not reasonably
foreseeable under negligence); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C.
2003) (refusing to recognize negligent enablement of imposter fraud as a viable cause
of action because the relationship between the parties was "too attenuated").
150. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1372 (recognizing a duty owed to a victim of identity
theft); cf. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d 275 (declining to establish a duty owed by financial
institution to third party victim).
151. Lyles, supra note 80 (explaining that FACTA establishes a higher, more
specific standard of care which makes common law negligence claims obsolete).
152. The Red Flags Rule: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16.
153. See, e.g., Perry v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
unambiguous language of § 1681m(h)(8) demonstrates that Congress intended to
preempt private causes of action to enforce § 1681m."); Rollins v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 379 F.Supp.2d 964, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("It is undisputed that there is no
private right of action under § 1681s-2(a).").
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Rule.154 Such an amendment would solve the problems of lack of
duty and foreseeability created by negligence claims because, as a
result of The Rule, a duty is owed by the financial institution to
comply with The Rule and failure to comport leads to foreseeable
harm.155
The inclusion of a private cause of action for
noncompliance should also provide for express preemption of
state tort law claims. This would leave noncompliance, as
established in the statute, as victims' sole recourse for recovery
from identity theft for any negligent or willful conduct by a
financial institution or creditor that results in the institution's
inability to detect and prevent red flags. By replacing the common
law negligence claims, the query would become whether or not
there has been a willful or negligent violation of FACTA's Red
Flags Rule.156 Such a determination of noncompliance lacks the
uncertainty created by the varying state tort claims, providing for a
more reliable and predictable remedy.'
The determination of noncompliance should be made by
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), an
independent agency established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)."'
The Bureau is authorized through Title X of Dodd- Frank59 to
enforce and administer existing federal consumer financial
154. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 114, § 615
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A) (2006)) (foreclosing civil actions
brought for noncompliance with The Rule and restricting redress to administrative
enforcement).
155. See id. § 1681m(e).
156. See id. §§ 1681n-o.
157. See Hoofnagle, supra note 56 ([Negligence claims fail] from both economic
and moral perspectives. Economically, a negligence regime could create inefficiency,
because uncertainty would surround the optimal level of care to prevent leaks of
personal information.") (citing Danielle Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution
of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
241, 263-64 (2007)).
158. See Gill Rudawsky, New Consumer Financial Bureau Keeps Main Street Safe
from Wall Street, DAILY FIN., July 23, 2010, 6:00 AM,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/credit/new-consumer-bureau-keeps-main-street-
safe-from-wall-street/19565123/.
159. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.




protection laws. 160 This would make the Bureau the primary
rulemaking agency for FACTA and its Red Flags Rule.
Therefore, while the regulations expounding The Rule were
originally created by the FTC in conjunction with the other
primary federal banking agencies, authority over The Rule and its
rulemaking will be transferred to the Bureau in the future.162 The
amendments called for here would thus be administered by the
Bureau.6 1
The enforcement regime established to redress
noncompliance with The Rule currently provides for
administrative enforcement by the FTC or the appropriate federal
bank regulator.'" With the passage of Dodd-Frank, enforcement
of The Rule will be shared by the Bureau and the other federal
banking agencies, primarily the FTC, depending upon the size and
function of the covered institution.'6  Thus, as the statute currently
exists, private civil action is provided for under other sections of
the FCRA but is precluded for purposes of The Rule.'66
Administrative enforcement as a means of redressibility for
identity theft is inadequate because it fails to provide
compensation for the consumer victim of the identity theft.67
160. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau- Overview of Key Provisions, CENTER




162. See id. (explaining that the date for transfer of authority to the Bureau is
tentatively scheduled to occur within 6 to 12 months of Dodd-Frank's passage, with a
possible 6 month extension).
163. See id.
164. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,772 (Nov. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 681) (subjecting entities not in compliance to
administrative enforcement of the FCRA by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1)).
165. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau- Overview of Key Provisions, supra
note 160 (stating that the Bureau has primary enforcement authority over "large
depository institutions" with assets over $10 billion and exclusive enforcement
authority over non-banks that are "either payday lenders, providers of mortgage-
related services, larger market participators, [or] bad apples in the market." Other
covered non-bank institutions will be subject to the FTC's enforcement.).
166. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o (2006) (providing for
civil liability for financial institutions and credits to consumers for willful or negligent
noncompliance with the statute).
167. See § 1681s (providing for administrative review and enforcement for
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Instead, the FTC collects a civil penalty for the violation or
implements injunctive orders against the offending institution."
This in no way inures to the benefit to the victim. Thus,
individuals like Michelle, are currently unable to collect from the
facilitating financial institution under the theory of negligence
because of the lack of duty and foreseeability and unable to collect
under a theory of noncompliance with The Rule because the
statute explicitly precludes such action.'69
3. Identity Theft Matters are Better Left to the Legislature
The Rule in FACTA prescribes mandatory and industry
specific standards for financial institutions and creditors that will
both reduce the instance of true name fraud as well as establish a
national standard of care to be adopted by financial institutions
and businesses controlling consumers' personal information.o
This should help alleviate the problems presented by adjudicating
the claims under negligence, namely the lack of duty and
foreseeable harm."' A financial institution may currently
implement anti-fraud mechanisms at its discretion, abide by those
mechanisms, and thus not be legally negligent because it operated
in accordance with due care by following the procedures it had in
place.7  The Red Flags Rule fixes this problem by explicitly
establishing the necessary standards all institutions must adopt."
Private action for noncompliance with The Rule would thus
noncompliance).
168. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(g) (2006) (describing the various remedies a federal
banking agency may impose upon a bank or related institution that violates
FACTA's Red Flags Rule).
169. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
170. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000) ("[S]uch complicated
factfinding and such a debatable social judgment are not wisely required of courts
unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with its
preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social value.");
Vartanian & Nelson, supra note 7, at 8; Lyles, supra note 80.
171. See infra pp. 116-122.
172. See Hoofnagle, supra note 56.
173. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity




provide redressibility where negligence claims fall short.174
Although FACTA should reduce the number of cases resulting
from true name fraud, Congress, with its members' diverse views,
unique agencies, and constitutionally derived legislative
capabilities,' is better situated to address and implement the
large-scale reform necessary to eradicate identity theft than courts
applying poorly defined and inconsistent common law principles.176
The judiciary is ill-equipped and lacks sufficient resources to
177
adjudicate every instance of identity theft.
In declining to recognize negligent enablement of imposter
fraud as a valid cause of action for victims of identity theft, the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated, "we conclude that the
legislative arena is better equipped to assess and address the
impact of credit card fraud on victims and financial institutions
alike."'
V. AMENDING FACTA TO INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR TRUE Loss
OF DAMAGES TO VICTIMS
A private cause of action for noncompliance with
FACTA's Red Flags Rule is a better avenue through which to
compensate victims of true name fraud than seeking remedies
174. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 261-68
(2007).
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power ... To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.").
176. The respective roles of the independent branches of government were
described by the Court as follows:
But such complicated factfinding and such a debatable social
judgment are not wisely required of courts unless for some reason
resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with its preferable
forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social
value.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000).
177. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) ("The very difficulty of
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to
pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable.").
178. Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
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under common law claims.179 FACTA should be amended to make
the system more just for consumer victims of identity theft and to
promote uniformity and consistency in its application by
permitting a private cause of action for noncompliance with The
Rule. This allows victims to recover for their losses under a clearly
defined federal regime.
A. Provide for Private Causes of Action and More Explicit
Compensatory Damages
While the current FCRA regime 18 provides for remedies
through claims brought for noncompliance with particular sections
of the statute, the section pertaining to The Rule precludes private
civil action. 82 Therefore, the only available remedies provided
under the current statute are through administrative enforcement
in the form of injunctive relief or monetary penalties levied against
the institution.183 According to the plain language of the statute,
the consumer victim of the identity theft has no means to recover
for his or her losses resulting from noncompliance with The
Rule.'8" However, courts have varied in their application of
FACTA's enforcement, with some jurisdictions claiming that no
private cause of actions are permitted and others insisting that the
statute's language does not preclude a victim's private claim
against the facilitating financial institution. 5 Such divergent
179. See Haney v. Fire Ins. Exch., 277 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)
(declining to recognize negligence claim for lack of duty); Pritchett v. ICN Med.
Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 937 (Ala. 2006) (holding that due to lack of
foreseeability, no liability arises); Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36-37
(N.Y. 1985) (explaining that liability should be limited so as to avoid imposing
crushing liability upon a party).
180. U.S. Const. art. 14, § 1; see Rabino v. Pennsylvania, 450 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) (stating that law should be applied "with the twin goals of
uniformity and fairness").
181. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §1681s (2006).
182. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 114, § 615 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A) (2006)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Barnette v. Brook Rd., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-49 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(finding that § 1681m(h)(8) does not eliminate private causes of action for the entire
section which includes the Rule, but instead only eliminates private actions related to
subsection 1681m(h)). But see Stavroff v. Gurley Leep Dodge, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d
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interpretations indicate ambiguity in the statute and possible
willingness to make alterations to the law's enforcement. The
statute should be amended to explicitly provide for private causes
of action, allowing individual victims to recover for their harm
where such recovery currently is, according to a majority of
jurisdictions, unavailable under The Rule and common law tort
claims.1 8
There are four primary reasons supporting amendments to
FACTA to expressly provide for additional compensation for true
name fraud victims. First, one of the reasons so many victims seek
remedies under common law tort claims is the large awards they
will be able to collect once their pain and suffering'" have been
taken into account as well as any punitive damages that might be
deemed appropriate. While these common law tort claims lack
consistency and create confusion for the courts,'8 there is validity
in the desire for additional damages, given the extensive emotional
and economic suffering of the victim.18 For this reason, FACTA's
noncompliance damages provision, once included, should
explicitly include awards for these general damages'9 and state the
appropriate ceiling that should be applied.1 91 This removes any
962, 966 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (holding that the language of the statute eliminates all
private actions related to § 1681m).
186. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1681s; Lyles, supra note 80 ("[I]t is likely that, over
time, the Red Flags Rule will become a de facto standard of care applied to
determine whether a company has negligently [sic] allowed a customer's identity to
be stolen.").
187. See Identity Theft, supra note 1 (statement of Michelle Brown, Identity Theft
Victim).
188. See Wood & Schecter, supra note 20, at 8 ("Courts have struggled to advance
a consistent theory for imposing duties on financial institutions with respect to the
disclosure of consumer information.").
189. See Howard, supra note 6, at 1272-75 (explaining the ordeal Bridgette Patrick
went through as a victim of identity theft).
190. See Meerscheidt v. Wyoming, 931 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo. 1997) ("Damages for
pain, suffering, and mental anguish are general damages."); Mariner v. Marsden, 610
P.2d 6, 11 (Wyo.1980) ("[General damages are] those which may not be fixed with
any degree of pecuniary exactitude but which, instead, involve mental or physical
pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of gratification of intellectual or physical
enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style which cannot really be measured
definitively in terms of money.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Welding
Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 352 (La. 1974)).
191. See 15 U.S.C. H§ 1681n-o (implementing specific ceilings on the recoverable
damages for noncompliance with certain sections of the Act).
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ambiguity as to the size of recoverable damages. The
administrative enforcement process should be kept as a regulatory
mechanism to incentivize compliance as well as ensure safe and
sound practices. * Any damages awarded by way of private suits
should be assessed above any civil penalty imposed by the bank
regulator. In drafting the amendment to The Rule for inclusion of
private civil action for noncompliance, Congress should use
sections 1681n and 1681o of the Act which address negligent and
willful noncompliance as applied to other provisions of the Act as
a drafting tool.193 These standards will provide consistency for
application of The Rule and set a limit on damages recoverable.194
These recoverable damages should be measured upon a sliding
scale that takes into consideration such factors as the level of
noncompliance, the presence of red flags that should have alerted
the institution of fraud, and the adequacy of the ITPP in place.195
Second, the amendments would diminish the need to bring
common law emotional distress tort claims since the remedies for
these general damages would be provided for in the statute.'9 The
courts have been reluctant to recognize these claims because of
their failure to establish a duty owed between the parties.'9
Third, the proposed amendments would incentivize
compliance with the Red Flags rule.98 If larger payouts under the
statute are awarded with consistency for noncompliance, then
banks have more at stake and will take compliance more seriously
and understand what needs to be done to be in full conformity
192. See id. §§ 1681m(e) & 1681s (establishing the administrative enforcement
regime).
193. See id. §§ 1681n-o.
194. See id.
195. See Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and
Mitigation, 16 C.F.R. § 681 app. a (Supp. A 2009) (discussing the guidelines
established to aid institutions in enacting an ITPP and what factors are pertinent to
adopting a successful prevention program).
196. See Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 248, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (refusing
to recognize plaintiffs claims of negligent enablement of imposter fraud and
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress due to lack of relationship
between the parties and absence of a duty owed).
197. See Howard v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2004 WL 503515, at *1 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004). (stating that because emotional distress claims "sound in negligence," the
same elements must be established).
19& See Wood & Schecter, supra note 20, at 8.
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with The Rule."' In essence, it would be adopting a "stick"
approach to compliance. 20 However, in the long run, it will be less
expensive for financial institutions and creditors to implement an
ITPP and pay the statute's noncompliance damages for any
breaches than it would for them to finance and struggle over
litigation initiated by consumer victims for damages pursuant to a
tort law claim, especially considering the inconsistency with which
courts in the past have applied common law claims to instances of
true name fraud.201
Finally, providing for a private cause of action for
noncompliance so as to effectively eliminate the need for common
law tort claims conserves judicial resources.202  Because of the
limited time, resources, and capacity of the judiciary, it is vital that
only those suits necessarily requiring adjudication go before the
courts. 20 3 Furthermore, suits lacking consistency and uniform rules
of law expend more of the judiciary's limited resources than do
other claims.204 By limiting the claims available to victims of true
name fraud and establishing explicit statutory rules directing these
suits, fewer resources are expended and the limited judicial
* 205capacity is conserved.
In enacting the amendments proposed herein, Congress
should take heed and learn from the legislation stemming from
violations of the debit and credit card truncation provision of
199. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111, 102 S. Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1982) (discussing the value of a statute that has penalties designed to serve
the dual goals of consistent application and fairness to the violator); United States v.
Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1340, 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("To accomplish
the statutory purpose of deterring violations, a penalty must ensure that disobedience
does not pay. As a general rule, an offender should be deprived of any benefit
derived from [the violation.]")
200. See Rivas-Mira v. Holder, 556 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009) (providing a definition
of a "stick" approach as a method of ensuring compliance through threatening
behavior or punishment).
201. See Delany, supra note 19, at 559-63.
202. See Commonwealth v. Hinterleitner, 464 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Mass. 1983)
("Counsel should always be sensitive to the need to conserve judicial resources and
the importance of avoiding inconvenience."); Hooker v. Simon, 2010 WL 3516662
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2010) (noting the importance of conserving the judiciary's limited
resources).
203. See, e.g., Foster v. RSC Equip. Rental, Inc., 2009 WL 4840649 (N.D. Ga. Dec
1, 2009) (speaking to the importance of conserving judicial resources).
204. See Hooker, 2010 WL 3516662.
205. See e.g., Foster, 2009 WL 4840649.
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FACTA206 that became fully effective in December 2006.207 The
provision applies to electronically printed receipts and states that
"no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the
card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to
the cardholder at the point of sale or transaction. ""8 This section
of FACTA is subject to the noncompliance provisions established
in section 1681n and section 1681o which provide for private
causes of actions brought by consumer victims.20 For instances of
negligent noncompliance, the victim of the noncompliance with
the truncation provision must show loss resulting from the
noncompliance, and is then only able to recover for actual losses
and attorney's fees.2 10 For willful noncompliance, however, the
consumer victim does not have to show harm and is able to
recover statutory damages up to $1,000 for each violation.21 ' The
differences in the two provisions place great importance upon
intent; however the harm to the consumer is the same whether the
facilitating institution is negligent of willful.212 With the resulting
harm the same, the burden of proof and damages differences seem
excessive. 2 13 Thus, in drafting the private cause of action provision
for The Rule, Congress should be careful to distinguish between
technical violations that cause no additional harm to consumers
and violations of The Rule that cause a consumer's identity to be
stolen, leading to grave consequences for the victim. 214 Only in the
latter of these cases should compensatory damages be permitted so
206. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 113, § 605
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1681c(g) (2006)).
207. Client Alert, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Truncation Now
Required of Credit Card Data under FACTA: Plaintiff's Attorneys File Numerous
Class Action Lawsuits, (Feb. 19, 2007), http://www.wcsr.com/articles/truncation-now-
required-of-credit-card-data-under-facta-plaintiffs-attorneys-file-numerous-class-
action-lawsuits.
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1).
209. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o.
210. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. See Michael E. Chaplin, What's So Fair About the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transaction Act?, 92 MARQ. L. REV 307, 319 (2008) (raising concerns of due process
violations posed by the remedies provisions).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 315-19.
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as to preserve the effectiveness of the system and preclude
violations of the judicial system and its resources while at the same
time respecting due process.215 However, in contrast to the award
established in section 1681n for negligent noncompliance, the
recoverable damages should constitute more than simply actual
damages in order to compensate the consumer victim for the
emotional and temporal harm he or she suffered.216
B. Impose More Inclusive Preemption Provisions
More inclusive preemption provisions will serve to further
eliminate state common law claims as well as prevent "states from
imposing stronger duties on [financial institutions] .217 Under
Dodd-Frank, states are permitted to provide stricter consumer
protection laws than those established by the Bureau, thus
218applying an anti-preemption notion to consumer protection.
However, because of the national character of the battle against
identity theft,2 19 it is imperative that uniformity of law and
consistency of judicial opinion exist across all jurisdictions, an
220
importance that should outweigh an anti-preemption notion.
Preemption of state law claims will provide this essential
uniformity.221 The idea of uniformity has been recognized as
important in confronting the issue of international fraud and can
215. See id. at 317 ("A long recognized judicial principle provides that 'where the
penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the
offense and obviously unreasonable' the penalty violates due process and is,
therefore, without effect.") (quoting St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S.
63, 66-67 (1919)).
216. See supra Part V.A.
217. The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Issues Presented by Reauthorization of the
Expiring Preemption Provisions: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 108" Cong. 69 (2003); see also Delany, supra note 19, at 559-63.
218. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau- Overview of Key Provisions,
supra note 160.
219. See Delany, supra note 19, at 560.
220. See 108 CONG. REC. H8122 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Michael Castle) ("This is uniformity, not a state-by-sate issue; and as Congress we
must protect the consumers.").
221. See id. (statement of Rep. Michael Castle) ([By not adopting uniform
FACTA provisions] "we would ... create more difficulties for our already-struggling
economy. For example, according to a recent report commissioned by the Financial
Services Roundtable, the loss of national uniform credit reporting standards would
produce a 2 percent drop in the gross domestic product of this Nation.").
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be equally vital to the prevention of the nation's epidemic levels of
interstate true name fraud.222
Providing increased remedies for victims of true name
fraud will eliminate the need and application of state common law
claims,223 by providing more pervasive and explicit preemptive
measures within the language of FACTA.224 Additionally, a more
defined and identifiable standard of care will emerge which will
allow financial institutions to conform their behavior accordingly
and eliminate the need for various common law and state statutory
claims.225 Consumer protection is traditionally an area in which
Congress prefers to allow states to adopt stricter protections for its
citizens, free from conflict preemption.22 6 However, by including
explicit federal legislative preemption within the amended version
222. The importance of uniformity is described by one commentator as follows:
One step towards uniformity and prevention of cross-border fraud
issues is to create a binding international instrument in the form of
a treaty. In order for such a treaty to be successful, it must
recognize the concerns with cross-border fraud activities. It must
define both online-identity theft and Internet fraud as global
offenses. In addition to providing both criminal and civil sanctions
for violators, it must also provide adequate remedies for victims to
seek redress and damages.
Brian C. Pidcock, Chester James Taylor 2008 Award Winner: Cross-Border Fraud:
Bridging Global Protection Disparity Through International Cooperative Efforts, 17
CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 78, 88 (2008); Identity Theft Investigation and Penalties:
Hearing Before the H.Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., supra
note 57, at 17-19 (noting how technology provides personal information to flow
across state borders, highlighting the necessity of a national standard); HATCH, supra
note 56, at 6 ("Mari Frank, a California attorney and victim, has helped hundreds of
identity theft victims. She testified that because identity crimes occur across State
lines, a Federal law making identity theft a crime is essential.").
223. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2006) (amending
this provision for larger recoverable damages will decrease, and ultimately eliminate
the need for common law tort claims).
224. See Montgomery v. Bank of America, Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (C.D.
Cal. 2007) (stating that Congress may preempt state law by explicitly declaring the
law preempted within the language of the statute).
225. See 108 CONG. REC. H8122 (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley) ("Creating a
set of uniform national standards will benefit people across the economic spectrum
and is the perfect vehicle to fight the crime of identity theft.").
226. See Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1088 (Cal. 2008)
("[C]onsumer protection laws such as the [UCL], false advertising law, and CLRA,




of The Rule that requires preemption of state tort law claim
relating to counteracting identity theft, the problem of conflict
preemption is avoided.227  This would allow the enforcement
provisions to be upheld even within the anti-preemption area of
consumer protection law. Additionally, if written sternly and
stringently, there would be no need for additional, stricter state
laws.
C. Benefits of the Proposed Amendments to the Financial System
The proposed amended version of FACTA is more
beneficial to the financial system than the current method that
permits tort law claims. First, as previously discussed,22 8 broader
preemption of state laws will provide uniformity. 229 Because of the
national importance and pervasiveness of identity theft, it is vital
that regulations be uniform so as to provide clear legal standards
for financial institutions and to maintain enhanced regulation of
230the financial system. If financial institutions and creditors are
able to reference a uniform law regarding their role in preventing
identity theft, they will be better able to comport their practices
and understand the liabilities imposed should such conformity not
be achieved. 231
227. See id. ("In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress
has 'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.").
228. See supra Part V.B.
229. See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 401 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
that when Congress deems a matter to be of federal concern, state law should be
preempted to ensure uniformity); Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 942-43 (9th Cir.
2010) (stating that state laws should be preempted when they impede Congress's
uniform administration of the law); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 157 (6th Cir.
1969) (discussing Congress's desire for interstate uniformity in matters of national
importance).
230. See 108 CONG. REC. H8126 ("Any time Congress debates the issue of pre-
empting State law, we have to question whether or not the Federal Government
knows better than the States how to pass a law that affects our citizens.").
231. See Bailey v. Heald, 17 Tex. 102, 103 (1856) ("We regarded it important that
uniformity of decision on a question of so much importance to commerce should be
observed."); ANGIE L. WELBORN AND LORETTA NoTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32121, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF HOUSE,
SENATE AND CONFERENCE VERSIONS 3 (2003) (revealing that both the House and the
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Second, the amendments will provide an incentive for
financial institutions to comply with The Rule in order to avoid
litigation and large awards.2 32 Currently, litigation is not available
for noncompliance with The Rule and is only utilized through
common law claims seeking remuneration for identity theft.
And even though litigation and individual awards will be
components of noncompliance suits, presumably there will be less
complication, disagreement, and fact finding making the suits far
less expensive and lengthy than suits brought pursuant to common
law tort claims. This is because noncompliance will be explicitly
delineated and defined by the amended statute. The more
financial institutions observe The Rule and its requirements, the
more smoothly the system will run and the more successful the
nation as a whole will be in preventing the growth and occurrence
of identity theft.234
Third, the amended statute will promote fairness by giving
institutions a chance to reasonably conform their behavior to the
new standards."5 Moreover, any actions based on noncompliance
will result in fair and adequate judgments granted throughout all
*236jurisdictions.
Finally, it is important that contained within the statutory
language there is a ceiling placed on recoverable damages for
actual harm suffered. 237  This ceiling should reflect adequate
compensation for identity theft victims by taking into
Senate desired strong federal preemption standards in relation to identity theft).
232. See Wood & Schecter, supra note 20, at 8.
233. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, sec. 114, § 615
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1681m(e) (2006)).
234. See Lyles, supra note 80.
235. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 219 (1992) (claiming that the
purpose of sentencing reform was to improve that scheme's fairness and rationality of
application. The same objectives should motivate federal preemption and statutorily
proposed ceilings on damages in order to promote efficiency and equality.).
236. See Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act Hearing, supra note 37, at 17-19
(testimony provided by Robert Ryan, Senior Director of Government Regulations,
TransUnion, LLC) (stating that because more holders of personal information are
large, national corporations, it is important that a national standard be implemented).
237. See Chaplin, supra note 212, at 311 (discussing the pitfalls of a system lacking
in a limit to recoverable damages).
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consideration the risk factors of the red flags as well as the degree
of noncompliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fight against identity theft should be waged in the
legislative arena with a focus upon preventative, as opposed to ex
post, solutions to the ever increasing problem of true name fraud.
Specifically, FACTA's Red Flags Provision provides broad and
flexible preventative measures that financial institutions and
creditors must adopt in order to impede the occurrence of true
name fraud.239 There should be amendments to the statute's
damages provision as well as stricter preemption provisions to
ensure efficiency, consistency and adequate compensation to
consumer victims of identity theft. If amendments are made to the
damages provided under FACTA and to its preemptive scope, the
statute would provide an appropriate and sufficient cause of action
for consumer victims of identity theft, leaving no reason to expand,
or even recognize, tort liability as a means of recourse for true
name fraud.
MIGNON M. ARRINGTON
238. See supra Part V.
239. See Lyles, supra note 80.
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